Written by Nasser Kandil,
The negotiation process which accompanied the wars of the resistance has what is enough to study the science of war, the negotiation, and their interaction, and how the negotiation becomes a war by other means, and how the struggle of the wills in the negotiation becomes more difficult and needs more skills and qualifications in addition to wills and resolutions that are stronger than those required by the war. This speech may not be of interest to some Lebanese people who did not feel that an extra dignity has been put on their heads neither now nor in July 2006 or that some of their lands were hostage and now liberated, or that some of them have been arrested in 2006 and now they came back free, but among the Lebanese people there is a big majority that has felt the greatness of accomplishment and its magnitude and some of those who are abroad are following-up this dazzling experience in its military competences and its negotiating determination.
As in the war of July the resistance and some of the official Lebanon were on the bank of negotiation, but unlike the war of July 2006 there is no reverse momentum from inside the country to weaken the will and to reduce the ceiling, but most importantly is that this time the official part was solid as the resistance in dealing with the negotiating ceilings, depending on a decision that the resistance would have born its consequences in the battlefield if the negotiation has been disabled totally. Here is the historic moment in every negotiation. As in July this moment has passed now it passed, when the other party in the negotiation reaches to irrevocable conditions and when these conditions grant the resistance and the country the main goal of negotiations, for example in July the conditions were the withdrawal of Israel from the points to which it preceded, to cease-fire and to set free the detainees, but this raises the cost to become an indicator of the change of the image between the defeated and the victorious. In the war of July the issue was the Chapter VII, while in the negotiations with Al Nusra the issue was those who were accused and arrested in charges of terrorist crimes that cannot be forgiven. So in both cases the negotiator on the opposite bank has accepted the main demands and prepared his demands and his additional terms. On the eve of the issuance of the resolution 1701 Condoleezza Rice told the Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri that the Chapter VI is an attempt to promote the Chapter VII in order to apply it smoothly, but the decisive answer was let the war continue. Today the last thing proposed by Al Nusra was that we are getting out of Lebanon, so why do you complicate the matter in justifying the additional demands?, the answer of the Major General Abbas Ibrahim was decisive I will leave my lines open till the midnight and after that I will not hear you, if you accept what I proposed without conditions then let me know, otherwise the resolving will be in the field. In the both cases the resistance won and Lebanon won, the issue was not mere a negotiator's courage but there were arrangements and preparations to continue the war.
Is it possible to imagine the size of responsibility that is borne by the decision-maker and the negotiator in estimating the position and what will result from the reverse probability? The opposite negotiator and who supports him will be obliged to go to war after the war was close to its end and that there will be coming round of making sacrifices. It is certain that such of this possibility despite all the analyses must be present in the negotiation. It is a big burden and an important national responsibility. To those who endured it in both cases God bless your resolution, will, and achievements. This is the resistance and this is the country which we boast and admire.