Written by Nasser Kandil,
Theoretically, there are two teams which stand on two different banks but their positions towards the battles of Hezbollah in JuroudArsal and Shebaa Farms are similar: the Israeli leadership and the leadership of the 14thof March movement. The analogy between the two battles according to the two teams is presence but differently. Israel sees the battles of Hezbollah in JuroudArsalas a test for the upcoming battle in Shebaa Farms, while the team of the 14th of March links its positions from the two battles with one equation; the lack of trust, that what is fought for is a Lebanese territory, it considers that the main problem is to demarcate the Syrian-Lebanese borders in the two areas not the dominance of the terrorism in one area and the occupation in the other area.
The methodology of Hezbollah is the same in the two areas, a Lebanese area where the Lebanese have their livelihood and where the foreign aggressive occupier whether a terrorist or a Zionist is having control on it, so it must be liberated, while the liberated area requires a coordination with the Syrian who is involved to liberate a parallel part, which is the remaining of the Syrian Qalamoun and Golan in the south. After the liberation it is easier to cooperate in demarcating the borders between Lebanon and Syria, this is the response to the Lebanese party, while in response to the Israeli reading Hezbollah seems uninterested in responding or discussing. It does not care whether the Israelis see more of readiness or read more of ability and thus more of panic, since it is the function of all its battles to accomplish the achievement on one hand, and to increase the enemy's certainty of its near defeat on the other hand, so this enhances the deterrence balances and a part of the elements of the psychological warfare.
The Israelis go further in their comments they do not see mere a show of strength in Juroud of Arsal as in Aleppo or other battles in which Hezbollah waged or participated in Syria, but they took into considerationthe military tactics and how to deal with geography in order to say that Hezbollah after his battle in Juroud has become ready for a battle in Shebaa Farms, their military leaders depend on two matters which they consider among the conditions of the completion of readiness, and which were shown in the battles of Juroud in a way that is not ideal for the battle of Juroud but it was tested, appliedand proven its effectivity, since it is ideal for the wars of farms.
The first thing is to apply the movement in the shadow of fires to ensure the speed of accomplishment and the surprise, this is a rare military principle because of its danger, the progress of the units of penetration before the stopping of the preliminary bombing fire is very dangerous unless the fiery units and the units of penetration are equipped with a high degree of skill and accuracy as well as a high degree of harmony and mutual confidence, because such of this process cannot be accomplished but by rare selected units that live the continuous exercise for such a shoulder-to-shoulder operation between the fire -units which are responsible for covering the progress under fire and the parallel commandos units specialized in the intrusion. The resorting to it is justified by the estimation of the Operations Command of having limited time to accomplish the mission before the arrival of the support of the enemy's units or before the intervention of the enemy's flight or other similar elements. In the opinion of the Israeli commanders this kind of fighting in the war of Juroud was not necessary, but it is necessary in the war of farms. The war of Juroud says that what has been done by Hezbollah is exceptional and dazzling at this level.
The second matter is the movement from the lowest to the highest, in the wars of progress in the barrens or mountains, the armies which want to break through and to progress must search for higher points in which they localize in order to start its attack from high to low using the vision and the superiority of fire as well as the easiness to move. According to the Israeli reading this was available to Hezbollah in the war of Juroud, but the intention to proceed from the bottom to the top was not to surprise or to contradict the expectation of Al Nusra elements by choosing the difficult points to start the attack, but because the war in the farms has just the opportunity to move from the bottom to the top, and because the Israeli is in the heights, So this enhances the conclusion that the requirements of taking the war of Juroud as an example and an experience of the war of farms was in order to test the fighting tactics of Hezbollah contrary to the requirements of the same battle in Juroud and which was proven that the wining in it with the most difficult conditions was easier with the easiest conditions.
The Israeli military and analysts added to these two features the geographical similarity of the two areas; the two hundred square kilometers which are free of people and which are stretched on the triangle of the deployment of the Lebanese and the Syrian armies accompanied with the forces of Hezbollah. They said that the Israeli political leadership has to behave according to the equation that Hezbollah has become ready for its war against us and which is among its priorities, so while we were happy because it got involved in Syria to dismiss us and assume that it is taken by the needs of its war in Syria, it turned his active participation in the war into qualitative exercise for the war with us, they concluded that this is the meaning of the words of Al Sayyed Hassan Nasrollah that the ground initiative will be in favor of Hezbollah in the next war