Written by Nasser Kandil,
The relationship between Riyadh and Washington is developing after choosing Riyadh as the first destination of the visit of the US President to the region from the Saudi gate which hosts for the meeting of the US President a gathering of Washington’s allies in devotion to its position on one hand, and the guests’ loyalty to Washington on the other hand. The visit will include the occupied Palestinian territories and will be culminated with US-Palestinian-Israeli tripartite meeting that aims to launch the negotiating process; it will be coincided with indicators of calming the US rough rhetoric which biases to Israel, hoping to create the appropriate conditions which are desired by Washington for the negotiating choice. The most prominent here is the US announcement of an implicit postponement of the decision of transferring the US embassy to Jerusalem according to what the US President has already promised, and the talk that the matter is under consideration and it will be postponed for six months followed by another six months, and so on through linking with the negotiating course.
There will be a quiet negotiating path under the sponsorship of America for the Palestinian cause that relieves Saudi Arabia, and a US hostile rhetoric against Iran as the first engagement front in the region that meets the aspirations of Riyadh, in addition to US initiative to approach the situations of the region where Saudi Arabia seems the first involved in them, this initiative will affect the arrangements of the region’s files and will draw a plan to deal with its problems, alliances, battles, and the mechanisms of its management, the Saudi inner position especially the balances of the royal family has role in it as well as costs in its accounts in exchange of the Saudi malleability which will have a prominent role in the escalation front against Iran and in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation file.
Syria and Libya files are of direct US interest in the war on ISIS, after the projects of changing the regimes have ended, and where the seeking to besiege Iran and Hezbollah is US interest as the war on ISIS. The Saudi role is predicative where the matter requires that, and where the regional roles in it are desired by America but not for Saudi Arabia. In exchange of its sticking to the Kurdish privacy in Syria, it wants to compensate Turkey by devoting its reference role devotion in the solution in Syria with the participation of Russia. In Libya where the most important title is the war on ISIS, the Saudi contribution serves the US visions, but the regional sponsorship of the war and settlements will be Egyptian with the partnership of Algeria when necessary. The facts provided by the situation in Syria and Libya show the weakness of the direct Saudi presence and the inability to offer anything other than money, whether to sabotage the settlements or to enhance the status of the forces which are joined by Washington for the settlement paths, both of them are directed by Washington but this does not justify any Saudi role.
In the Yemeni file, the international concern is focused on the catastrophic health situation and the urgent need to stop the war, in the light of the Saudi inability to make progress in the course of war militarily. The emergence of the Southern Movement as a direct party in the political process that suggests the separation from the north, and announces the transitional ruling council seems as an indicator that is added to the development of the media disagreements between the two partners of the war against Saudi Arabia; Ansar Alllah and the General People's Congress to crystallize a political Yemeni quartet that consists of the government of Mansour Hadi, Ansar Allah, the General People's Congress, and the Southern Movement . This seems a matter of US interest to discuss a federal constitutional formula that is similar to what the Americans want for Syria, in order to devote the security and the military Kurdish privacy. The Americans present the Yemeni pluralism as a source of change that relieves Saudi Arabia in a way that is different from the exclusive Saudi-Iranian bilateral, and as a source to alienate the Southern strategic areas as Bab Al Mandab and Aden away from the threats of the dominance of Al Houthis later on.
The Saudi exit without achieving Yemeni profits and without incurring losses is a US equation that coincides with a Saudi exit quietly from the Libyan and the Syrian files, this happens while the Americans decide to lift the sanctions on Sudan; the country which positioned politically and security under the Saudi auspices, and which has an African, demographical, and geographic importance, it locates off the Saudi coasts on the Red Sea, according to the US-Saudi relationships this will compensate Saudi Arabia after its exit from Syria, Libya, and Iraq to draw a new regional geography by transferring the Saudi leadership from the Arab and the Islamic wide range to the direct neighborhood, in a way that surpasses the traditional Gulf borders . In Yemen the endeavors to separate the Southern Movement and the General People's Congress from Ansar Allah will increase in order to make them close to Saudi Arabia through promises and temptations, therefore the solution will be devotion for the important Saudi role in Yemen along with Sudan and Djibouti and perhaps tomorrow Somalia, a west range for the Saudi leadership versus in the East a financial, political and security distinctive situation in Pakistan, while the Arab east and west is left for the other balances. According to the US perspective the relationship with Iran in the East seems a partnership relation that is limited with the red line which is the security of Israel, while according to the Saudi vital range it seems from the taboos.
Translated by Lina Shehadeh,